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MYTHBUSTER

THE TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION

 

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES REPRESENT A TINY PERCENTAGE OF TORT CASES FILED EACH YEAR. In 2004, medical malpractice cases accounted for an average of only four percent of tort cases in 13 states reporting.1

 

CONTRARY TO POPULAR MYTH, FEW INJURED PATIENTS FILE LAWSUITS.

FAR FROM BEING “BROKEN,” THE CURRENT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM WORKS WELL.  The Harvard School of Public Health recently found that the current system works: legitimate claims are being paid, non-legitimate claims are generally not being paid, and “portraits of a malpractice system that is stricken with frivolous litigation are overblown.”4  The authors found:

THE VAST MAJORITY OF TRUE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES SETTLE; “FRIVOLOUS” CASES DO NOT SETTLE.

THE NUMBER OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PAYMENTS IS DECLINING.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PAYOUTS ARE FAR SMALLER THAN COMMONLY BELIEVED AND COMPENSATE FOR SERIOUS INJURIES.

CONTRARY TO POPULAR NOTIONS, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR PATIENTS TO WIN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES BEFORE JURIES.

JURIES ARE COMPETENT AND ABLE TO HANDLE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES.  Consistent empirical studies show juries to be competent, effective, and fair decision makers able to handle complex cases.31

 

LITIGATION IMPROVES PATIENT SAFETY.  The New England Journal of Medicine confirmed in a breakthrough article by George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H., that litigation against hospitals improves the quality of care for patients.32  The author wrote, “In the absence of a comprehensive social insurance system, the patient’s right to safety can be enforced only by a legal claim against the hospital. … [M]ore liability suits against hospitals may be necessary to motivate hospital boards to take patient safety more seriously.… Anesthesiologists were motivated by litigation to improve patient safety.  As a result, this profession implemented 25-years-ago a program to make anesthesia safer for patients and as a result, the risk of death from anesthesia dropped from 1 in 5000 to about 1 in 250,000.”

 

A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF DOCTORS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MOST MALPRACTICE PAYMENTS.

FEAR OF LITIGATION IS NOT THE MAIN REASON DOCTORS DO NOT REPORT ERRORS.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AND PREMIUMS ARE A TINY PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL COSTS OF HEALTH CARE IN THIS COUNTRY.  

January 2007

 

NOTES

1 Examining the Work of State Courts, 2005, A National Perspective from the Court Statistics Project (2006) at 29.

2 National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine, “To Err is Human” (1999); Harvard Medical Practice Study (1990). In 2004, HealthGrades, Inc., which rates hospitals for insurers and health plans, concluded, from a study of Medicare records for all fifty states from 2000-2002, that the Institute of Medicine’s high figure of 98,000 was too low and that a figure of 195,000 annual deaths was more accurate. (Testimony of Neil Vidmar of Duke Law School before The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, Hearing on “Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients,” June 22, 2006 at 5.)

3 David A. Hyman and Charles Silver, “Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It's the Incentives, Stupid,”59 Vand. L. Rev. 1085, 1089 (May 2006) (citing Brian Ostrom, Neal Kauder & Neil LaFontain, Examining the Work of State Courts (2003) at 23).

4 David M.  Studdert, Michelle Mello, et al., “Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation,” New England Journal of Medicine, May 11, 2006.

5 David M.  Studdert, Michelle Mello, et al., “Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation,” New England Journal of Medicine, May 11, 2006.

6 Testimony of  Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson, II Professor of Law, Duke Law School before The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, “Hearing on Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients,” June 22, 2006 at 17. (citations omitted).

7 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, “Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims in Seven States, 2000-2004,” NCJ 216339 (Mar. 2007) at 7.

8 Ibid. at 17-18, 22.

9 Ibid. at 23.

10 Ibid. at 21.

11 Public Citizen, Congress Watch, The Great Medical Malpractice Hoax: NPDB Data Continue to Show Medical Liability System Produces Rational Outcomes, (January 2007) at 2. (This report analyzes data in the National Practitioner Data Bank Public Use File, dated 31 December 2005.)

12 Ibid. at 4.

13 “Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001,” U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 206240 (November 2004), at 4.

14 “Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001,” U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 206240 (November 2004), at 7.

15 Public Citizen, Congress Watch, The Great Medical Malpractice Hoax: NPDB Data Continue to Show Medical Liability System Produces Rational Outcomes, (January 2007) at 5, 9. (This report analyzes data in the National Practitioner Data Bank Public Use File, dated 31 December 2005.)

16 Ibid. at 2-5.

17 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, “Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims in Seven States, 2000-2004,” NCJ 216339 (Mar. 2007) at 1.

18 Testimony of  Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson, II Professor of Law, Duke Law School before The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, “Hearing on Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients,” June 22, 2006 at 13.

19 See, Americans for Insurance Reform, Stable Losses/Unstable Rates, 2004, http://www.insurance-reform.org/StableLosses04.pdf.

20 The Pet Food Institute puts these figures at $13 to $14 billion annually over the past few years. See, http://www.petfoodinstitute.org/reference_pet_data.cfm

21 Public Citizen, Congress Watch, The Great Medical Malpractice Hoax: NPDB Data Continue to Show Medical Liability System Produces Rational Outcomes, (January 2007) at 2.

22 Testimony of Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson, II Professor of Law, Duke Law School before The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, “Hearing on Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients,” June 22, 2006 at 10.

23 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U. S. Department of Justice, “Selected Findings, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001, Punitive Damage Awards in Large Counties, 2001,” NCJ 208445 (March 2005) at 3.

24  Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, “Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not ‘Moral Monsters,’” 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 975, 1009 (1995).

25  Ibid. at 15, 50-51.

26 Ibid. at15, 24, 43.

27 Ibid. at 15, 43.

28 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, “Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001,” NCJ 206240 (Nov. 2004) at 4, 7.

29 David M.  Studdert, Michelle Mello, et al., “Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation,” New England Journal of Medicine, May 11, 2006.

30 Testimony of  Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson, II Professor of Law, Duke Law School before The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, “Hearing on Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients,” June 22, 2006 at 8.

31 For an extensive list of studies demonstrating the competence of juries, see, e.g., Testimony of  Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson, II Professor of Law, Duke Law School before The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, “Hearing on Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients,” June 22, 2006 at 10 (“The overwhelming number of the judges gave the civil jury high marks for competence, diligence, and seriousness, even in complex cases …Systematic studies of jury responses to experts lead to the conclusion that jurors do not automatically defer to experts and that jurors have a basic understanding of the evidence in malpractice and other cases.  Jurors understand that the adversary system produces experts espousing opinions consistent with the side that called them to testify. Moreover, jurors carefully scrutinize and compare the testimony of opposing experts. They make their decisions through collective discussions about the evidence.… We also found that jury awards of prevailing plaintiffs in malpractice cases were correlated with the severity of the injury.”)(citations omitted);  Peters Jr., Philip G., “Doctors & Juries,” U of Missouri-Columbia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-33 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=929474 (“Four important findings emerge from the data. First, negligence matters. Plaintiffs rarely win weak cases. They have more success in toss-up cases, and fare best in cases with strong evidence of medical negligence. Second, jury verdicts are most likely to square with the opinions of experts hired to evaluate the jury's performance when the evidence of provider negligence is weak. This is the very set of cases that most worries critics of malpractice litigation. Juries agree with expert reviewers in 80 to 90 percent of these cases - a better agreement rate than physicians typically have with each other. Third, jury verdicts are much more likely to deviate from the opinion of an expert reviewer when there is strong evidence of negligence. Doctors consistently win about 50 percent of the cases which experts believe the plaintiffs should win. Fourth, the poor success of malpractice plaintiffs in these cases strongly suggests the presence of factors that systematically favor medical defendants in the courtroom. The most promising explanations for that advantage are the defendant's superior resources, the social standing of physicians, social norms against ‘profiting’ from an injury, and the jury's willingness to give physicians the "benefit of the doubt" when the evidence of negligence is conflicting.”)  See also, Marc Galanter, “Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote,” 55 Md. L. Rev.1093, 1109, note 45 (1996), citing Michael J. Saks, Small-Group Decision Making and Complex Information Tasks (1981); Robert MacCoun, “Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries,” in Verdict: Assessing the Civil Jury System 137 (Brookings Institution, Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Christy A. Visher, “Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence,” 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 1 (1987); Richard O. Lempert, “Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush to Judgment,” 80 Mich. L. Rev. 68 (1981).

32 George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H., “The Patient’s Right to Safety – Improving the Quality of Care through Litigation against Hospitals,” New England Journal of Medicine, May 11, 2006.

33 Public Citizen, The Great Medical Malpractice Hoax, at 12.

34 Ibid.

35 Carol M. Ostrom, “Lawsuit fears aren't reason for docs' silence, studies say,” Seattle Times, August 17, 2006 , citing from Thomas Gallagher, M.D., et al, “Choosing your Words Carefully: How Physicians Would Disclose Harmful Medical Errors to Patients,” Archives of Internal Medicine, Aug. 14, 2006.

36 Ibid.

37 George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H., “The Patient’s Right to Safety – Improving the Quality of Care through Litigation against Hospitals,” New England Journal of Medicine, May 11, 2006.

38 See, Americans for Insurance Reform, “Think Malpractice is Driving Up Health Care Costs? Think Again,” http://www.insurance-reform.org/pr/AIRhealthcosts.pdf

39 Congressional Budget Office, Limiting Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice 1, 6 (Jan. 8, 2004).